

ER Record I.D.# 0021244

ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION Records Processing Facility ER Record Index Form (Side 1 of 2)

DATE RECEIVED: 05/20/93 PROCESSOR: MLB

Part I: Complete all fields; indicate if not applicable or appropriate; please write legibly. Document TO: Eugene M. Weverka DOCUMENT DATE: 04/29/93 ORIGINATOR NAME: Jerry L. Bellows ORGANIZATION: DOE SYMBOL: LEO: DG PAGE COUNT: 12 SUBJECT/TITLE: DP West Condition Report

RECORD TYPE (Circle relevant type for primary record; type of attachments should be selected on Keywords List):

- Analytical Data, Article, Chain-of-Custody, Chart, Computer Output, Contract, Controlled Distribution, Drawing, Excerpt, FAX, Figure, Form, Interview, Letter, List, Logbook, Map, Memo, Microform, Notebook, Outline, Personal Notes, Photo, Plan, Procedure, Purchase Request, Receipt Acknowledgment, Report, Review, SOW, Study, Summary, Telephone Record, TOC, Transcription, Video, Work Plan, Other

RECORD CATEGORY: P RECORD PACKAGE #: —

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Table with 4 columns: TECH AREA(S), ADS NO(S), WBS NO(S), STRUCTURE NO(S)/MDA. Each column contains a box for listing relevant identifiers.



KEYWORDS: Circle relevant KEYWORDS from the list below for ER Record #: 21244

MISCELLANEOUS (List other indexing criteria as necessary; please write legibly):
Condition, Radiological, Fixed, Cylinder, Friable, Picric, insulation, tunnels
Hydrogen, Oxygen

Abandon	Burn	<u>Contaminant</u>	ERDA (Energy Research and Development Administration)	Glove Box
Aboveground Tank	Burn Site	Contract	Erosion	Graph
Absorption	-----	Control	Error	Guidance
Abstract	Cadmium	Controlled Distribution	ES&H (Environment, Safety, and Health)	Gun
Accelerator	Calisson	Core	Estimate	-----
Access	Calibration	Corrective Action	Evacuation	Handling
Accident	Canyon	Correspondence	Evaluation	Hazardous
Accumulation	Capacitor	Criteria	Evaporator	Health
<u>Acid</u>	Caucistic	Cyanide	Excavation	HE (High Explosive)
Active	CEARP (Comprehensive Environmental Assessment and Response Program)	-----	Exclusion	History
Administrative	Cement	Data	Exhaust	Hole
ADS (Activity Data Sheet)	CERCLA (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act)	Deadline	Experiment	Home Owner
Adsorption	Certification	Debris	Explosive	Hood
AEC (Atomic Energy Commission)	Cesium	Decision Analysis	Exposure	HSWA (Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments)
Aerial	Chain of Custody	Decommission	Extension	Hydrology
Agenda	Chamber	Decontamination	Extraction	-----
Agreement	Change Control	<u>Deficiency</u>	Facility	Impact
<u>Air</u>	Change Order	Deliverable	Fallout	Implementation
<u>Alpha</u>	Charge	Demolition	Farm	Implosion
Americium	Chart	Description	FAX	Impoundment
Analysis	Checklist	Detonation	Fence	Inactive
Analytical	Chemical	Development	Field	Incident
AOC (Area of Concern)	Chromium	Discharge	Figure	Incinerator
Approval	Cleanup	Disposal	Filter	Industrial
Aquifer	Clearance	Documentation	FIMAD (Facility for Information Management, Analysis, and Display)	Infiltration
ARAR (Applicable, Relevant, or Appropriate Requirements)	Closure	DOE (Department of Energy)	Finding	Injection Well
Archaeology	Clothing	Dose	<u>Fire</u>	Injury
Archive	CMI/RA (Corrective Measures Implementation/Remedial Action)	DQO (Data Quality Objectives)	Firing Site	Inorganic
Area	CMS/FS (Corrective Measures Study/Feasibility Study)	Draft	Fiscal	Inspection
Arsenic	Cobalt	Drainage	Fission	Installation
<u>Asbestos</u>	Comment	<u>Drainline</u>	Five-Year Plan	Interim
<u>Asphalt</u>	Committee	Drawing	Flow	Interim Action
<u>Assessment</u>	Community Relations	Drilling	Flow chart	Internal
Audit	Compliance	Drop Tower	Fluid	Interview
-----	Compressed Gas	Drum	<u>Form</u>	Inventory
Backfill	Computer Modeling	Dry Well	Framework	Investigation
Bacteria	Computer Output	Dump	Free	IRM (Interim Remedial Measure)
Barium	Concern	Duplicates	Fuel	Isotope
Baseline	Concrete	-----	Fume	-----
BCP (Baseline Change Proposal)	Concurrence	Ecology	Gamma	Lab Job
Beds	Configuration	Effluent	<u>Gas</u>	Laboratory
Bermed Area	Construction	EIS (Environmental Impact Statement)	Generation	Lagoon
Beryllium	Container	<u>Emission</u>	Generic	Land
Beta	Containment	Engineering	Geochemistry	Landfill
Biology	-----	Environmental	Geology	Laundry
Blank		EPA (Environmental Protection Agency)	Geophysics	Leach
Boiler		Equipment	Glass Beaker	Lead
Boneyard				Leak
Bunker				Legal
Buried				

United States Government

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Department of Energy

memorandum

Albuquerque Field Office
Los Alamos Area Office
Los Alamos, New Mexico 87544

DATE: APR 29 1993

REPLY TO:

ATTN OF: LFO:DG

SUBJECT: DP West Condition Report

TO: Eugene M. Wewerka, ADCM, LANL, MS A102

Attached is a copy of the DP West Condition Report conducted by my staff. Please respond to the deficiencies identified in Section IV B and recommendations 2-6 of section VI of the report within 30 days of receipt of this letter.

If you have any questions, please contact Dan Glenn at (505)-665-6351.



Jerry L. Bellows
Area Manager

cc: w/out attachment:
J. Jackson, Deputy Director
LANL, MS A101
B. Twining, Manager, AL
E. Beckner, DP-1, HQ

cc: w/attachment:
T. Rush, ES&H, LAAO
J. Ryan, ES&H, LAAO
S. Fong, ES&H, LAAO
R. Borders, HPD, AL

Received by ER-RPF

MAY 20 1993

YCG

2176 1644

memorandum

Area Office, Los Alamos

DATE: 23 April 83

REPLY TO

ATTN. OF: LFO: dg

SUBJECT: DP-WEST CONDITION REPORT

TO: Jerry Bellows

Per your direction, a team was established to perform a walk through of the facility in an effort to independently confirm LANL's position that there is no immediate health or safety concern which would warrant cessation of operations and immediate relocation of staff from DP-West. The following write-up identifies the actions that were performed and the results of the facility walk through.

I. Purpose:

The purpose of the assessment was for the Area Office to observe the conditions within DP-West and make an assessment as to the presence of any immediate health or safety concern to the workers or the general public as a result of the existing facility conditions or its associated operations.

II. Team Members:

<i>Name</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Responsibility</i>
Dan Glenn	FOB/LAAO	Team Leader / Operations
Tom Rush	ES&H/LAAO	Fire Protection
John Ryan	ES&H/LAAO	Industrial Safety
Bob Spake	Sciencetech	OSHA
Rex Borders	AL	Radiological Safety
Steve Fong	ES&H/LAAO	Air Emissions

In addition, specialists in each area were requested from the lab and accompanied the DOE team. The purpose of including the lab was two-fold. One to ensure that the laboratory representatives saw the same conditions that the DOE team observed, and second to provide immediate feedback to the team on specific technical issues.

III. Methodology

Prior to commencing the assessment the following documents were obtained and reviewed by some members of the team in an effort to understand the history of the facility and any previously identified deficiencies:

1. SNM Holdup Measurements for Los Alamos Exhaust Ducts, Interim Phase II Report, LA-12374-MS
2. DP West DECON Project 1978-1981 Final Condition Reports
3. Hazards Assessment
4. INC Safety Alert concerning Picric Acid

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Each member performed a walk down of the site in the areas under their responsibility. Every area within DP-West was toured; however, not every lab/room within each building was entered. The team was given direction prior at the start of the inspection to classify their observations into the following categories:

- A. Safety Deficiencies: For the purpose of this report a "Safety Deficiency" is defined as, "A condition which could cause death or serious injury to the workers, or cause either a radiological worker or a visitor to exceed their annual exposure limit as defined in Chapter II of the RADCON Manual
- B. Issues Requiring Prompt Attention: Concerns that require DP-West management to correct and report back to LAAO.
- C. Significant Observations: Issues which the facility management should address on a priority basis, but do not require a formal response.

IV. RESULTS:

A. Safety Deficiencies:

There were no Safety Deficiencies identified by the inspection team.

B. Issues Requiring Prompt Attention:

1. RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY:

Deficiency 1: Piping and ventilation ducting which had potential internal contamination were not posted in accordance with Article 412 of the RADCON Manual.

Discussion: Potential Internal contamination postings were not consistent or complete. Observations included large areas of the process ventilation ducting, ventilation ducting in the basement of Building 150, and large portions of the Chill Water System piping which were not posted.

Deficiency 2: The fixed contamination control program does not comply with Article 222.3 of the RADCON Manual.

Discussion: Article 222.3 identifies specific items associated with marking and coating areas of fixed contamination. While the RADCON Manual Laboratory implementation plan will address this issue, DP-West is particularly vulnerable to spreading contamination due to past operations and should take interim actions to mitigate potential release.

Building 4 lab space was originally painted orange, indicating that potential alpha contamination of the walls existed. Subsequently, the rooms were painted white, masking the original potential contamination markings.

Deficiency 3: Entries to the utility access tunnels were not adequately posted or locked.

Discussion: Posting for the contamination conditions were on the walls of the building instead of the access covers. The postings should also clarify the radiological conditions and the entry requirements, or in this case the fact that entry is prohibited. The tunnel access covers were not locked as stated by INC personnel and Final Condition Reports.

2. INDUSTRIAL SAFETY / HYGIENE / FIRE PROTECTION:

Deficiency 1: The 13.2 KVA transformer near the Filter Building north of Building DP-3 has a fuse compartment door that is not locked or otherwise secured against entry by untrained people as required by DOE 5480.4 prescribed standard ANSI C-2, 1990, National Electrical Safety Code, Section 12, Paragraph 120

Deficiency 2: Hydrogen Gas cylinders were not confined to operations in hoods or areas where National Electrical Code Explosion Resistant Class I Division II wiring is provided as required by DOE 5480.4 prescribed standards NFPA 70, 1993, National Electrical Code, Article 501. NFPA 50A, 1989, Gaseous Hydrogen Systems at Consumer Sites, Item 3-2.3. NFPA 45, 1991, Fire Protection for Laboratories Using Chemicals, Item 8-1.1.

Discussion: This was noted in Room 306, Bldg. DP-3 and Third Laboratory from the South in Building DP-150 on the day of inspection.

Deficiency 3: Oxygen gas cylinders were stored within 20 feet of carbon monoxide or propane cylinders where bottle racks and manifolds are provided outside buildings in conflict with 29CFR 1910.253(b)(4)(iii)(OSHA Standard)

Discussion: This was noted outside the west walls of Buildings DP-3 North and DP-5 South on the day of inspection. Oxygen cylinders should be segregated by either 20 feet of space or a non combustible barrier at least 5 feet high having a fire resistance of at least one-half hour.

Deficiency 4: Friable asbestos was observed in utility room 314-3, where asbestos insulated "elbows" had been incompletely removed from the piping.

Discussion: Most of the asbestos insulated pipes were adequately sealed and therefore free of friable asbestos fibers. However, there was at least one instance, room 314-3, where it was evident that asbestos insulated "elbows" were incompletely removed from the piping. The door to this utility room was properly posted for asbestos, but good practice requires that shreds of unsealed asbestos not be left in place, especially on overhead pipes.

Deficiency 5: Possible asphyxiate space

Discussion: In building 150, room 602, the NMR lab, there were dewars of compressed nitrogen and helium present which were used to chill electromagnets used for X-ray crystallography. The worker in this space claimed that he had calculated the results of a spill scenario, i.e. how much volume would be occupied by the released gases. He was not able to produce a copy of the calculations however. The workspaces were ventilated but, a larger portion of the ventilation system was reported to be a recirculating system, which would raise concerns about the amount of fresh air available. The HS-5 Industrial Hygienist committed to re accomplishing the air displacement calculations. There is a concern that these inert gases could leak into the workspace while not providing sufficient warning properties to the occupant(s) resulting in undetected depletion of oxygen and asphyxiation. The suggestion was made to provide a low oxygen warning device. This may be one remedy, but further evaluation is needed by HS-5 relative to air exchange rate, volume of work space, warning properties, escape routes, amount and rate of usage of compressed gases in this lab.

Deficiency 6: Chemical Storage

Discussion: In most of the labs there was evidence of efforts to properly store the small amounts of chemicals in use. However, one observation was made which raised concern about the compatibility of stored chemicals. Flammable storage cabinets which were fitted with rubber-like exhaust hoses designed to vent away vapors from the inside of the storage lockers were inspected. It was evident, that when the flammable storage lockers were opened, there was some accumulation of vapors inside, perhaps a mixture of ethers, benzene and other similar reagents, which apparently had leaked out of their containers and not been vented off by the exhaust hose.

3. OPERATIONS:

Deficiency 1: INC does not have adequate control to prevent personnel from entering or using the D&D areas of the facility.

Discussion: At least three of the doors which allow access to the D&D areas of the facility were not locked. Materials not belonging to INC Division are being stored in Building 2 south. INC retains responsibility for the area; however, MAT has been using the space for storage.

Based on the degraded conditions of this area and radiological risks, access should be strictly controlled and the area should not be used for storage. Ownership and authority for this area must reside within the same division.

Deficiency 2: Radiation Protection program does not test all individuals who may be exposed to airborne contaminants.

Discussion: Radiological Surveys are not sufficient to promptly detect a release of radionuclides from damaged walls or peeling paint. All workers are required to wear TLDs; however, not all the workers are required to be placed on a bioassay program which would detect internal alpha contamination. These two issues combined present a condition in which a potential for an unmonitored, un-identified uptake could exist.

Several of the walls and ceilings still held their layer of paint and those that did not were generally labeled adequately to show that the break had been monitored and found to be negative for radioactivity. However, there were at least three occasions where paint had broken loose and there was no label to show that the exposed material had been monitored for radioactivity. The inspection team had the Radiation Technician monitor the areas; the results were negative. Based on the decon project guidelines, all areas, with the exceptions noted in the individual reports, were decontaminated to levels of 2000 dpm / 100 cm². Policies identifying the threshold values for placing a person in a bioassay program already exist; however, based on the conditions at DP-West, the inspection team believes that a special review should be conducted (see Section VI of this report).

4. AIR EMISSIONS:

No findings which were not previously identified were observed. However in order to fully understand the facility conditions, the following information is provided.

Discussion: A review of the radionuclide air emission point sources was conducted in order to verify that monitoring systems were installed and operable. Limitations of this review are provided below:

- A visual check was not performed on all stacks to verify installed effluent control systems.

- Review of the source inventory was not conducted to verify the reported source term.
- The source hold up in the ventilation system is estimated on a past study at TA-21.

Stack monitoring at TA-21 does not meet NESHAPs Subpart H requirements. Noncompliance with Subpart H has previously been identified by LANL. LANL is currently investigating possible corrective actions.

A survey of the installed monitoring equipment, discussions with on-site personnel, and review of documents/records was conducted to evaluate on-site point sources for general compliance with Subpart H. Twelve stacks, which LANL has cited in past annual air emissions reports, were observed to verify that the stacks are operable and being monitored. Stacks which were no longer in use and had in the past vented radionuclides were also checked to ensure they were not operating.

All stacks which were reported to be monitored had installed paper filter sampling systems and were indeed operational. The following stacks were surveyed:

- Building 257, Stack FE-4, no emission controls
- Building 150, Stack FE-1
- Building 5, Stack FE-7, [Stacks FE-1, FE-2 not operational-OK]
- Building 315, Stack FE-1
- Building 4, Stack FE-1(2)
- Building 324, Stack FE-1(2), [Stack FE-1(2), Building 146 not operational-OK]
- Building 313, Stack FE-1
- Building 313, Stack FE-2
- Building 3, FE-6, [Stacks FE-1, FE-10 not operational-OK]
- Building 314, Stack FE-1
- Building 314, Stack FE-2
- Building 4, Stacks FE-3

The following are problems identified for all the stacks: Visual review of the monitoring systems indicated that all sampling locations would not meet Subpart H, ANSI N13.1 requirements. Visual indicators on the exterior sampling system showed some installed sampling probes may be misaligned with the effluent stream.

C. Priority Items not requiring a formal response.

- A refrigerator and a soft drink machine are placed opposite two doors in the corridor connecting Buildings DP-150 and DP-5 such that the width of the exit path is blocked by over 50% when the doors are open. These appliances should be moved to locations where they are not opposite a door.
Requirement: DOE 5480.4 prescribed standard NFPA 101-1991, Life Safety Code, Chapter 28, Item 2.3.2.
- A chemistry experiment or demonstration is being operated in the hall next to the soft drink machine noted above. Operations should not be conducted in exit ways.
Requirement: DOE 5480.4 prescribed standard NFPA 101-1991, Life Safety Code, Chapter 5, Item 5-1.3.3.
- The roof of Building DP-2 North leaks so badly that plaster and paint have degraded inside the building. This condition risks a possibility of leaching

hazardous or radioactive materials into the workspace and the possibility of shoring or damaging the electrical systems in the walls and roof spaces.

- The overall condition of the shower room just east of the Corridor Structure DP-315 is decrepit. This structure should be removed before the floor and roof further deteriorate to the point of collapse.
- Discontinue casual storage of materials in the crawl space beneath the office building east of Building DP-150.
NOTE: This storage was removed on the day it was found.
- Arrange for Fire Department familiarization tours of the facility.
NOTE: These visits had been scheduled to occur within a week.
- Compressed gas cylinders - numerous instances were observed of gas cylinders stored on the premises which are no longer needed for operations. For example, there were two 125 pound cylinders of chlorodifluoromethane (a refrigerant) stored outside building 150.
- MSDS - most laboratory spaces appeared to have binders of Material Safety Data Sheets, which are required references wherever hazardous chemicals are in use. However, there was at least one instance, the Pseudomonas bacteriology research lab in the northeast corner of building DP-3, where a particular MSDS was not readily available nor was the technician there able to identify the disinfectant chemical used to wipe down work surfaces.
- Postings in general are not in compliance with the RADCON Manual
- INC Management needs to assess potential impacts of future D&D activities on ongoing activities, such as building ventilation flow paths during tear-down, exposure to the workers in addition to the public, and the effect on neighboring facilities.

V. Assessment of the Concerns identified in Mr. Blush's letter of 29 Mar 93.

A. *"Piping in tunnels beneath the buildings is highly contaminated with plutonium. Residual nitric acid used to keep the plutonium in solution has seriously deteriorated the integrity of the piping".*

The inspection team could not initially obtain any data quantifying the actual radiological conditions in the tunnels. Discussions with various personnel indicated that the conditions were "severe" and that piping degradation is real ; however only the area Rad Technician was able to provide specifics indicating levels of contamination in the range of 200,000 dpm. Subsequent investigation identified additional documents, (i.e.; D&D NESHAPs Permit application) which identified the following conditions:

- Tunnel #2 soil had average Pu contamination of 240 nCi/g with a high of 1650 nCi/g.
- Tunnel #5 soil ranged from 1nCi/g to 46 nCi/g.
- Contamination levels of 2x10⁴ to 1x10⁶dpm/100 cm² gross alpha.
- Tunnel #3S & 4S soil contamination of 7nCi/g alpha, 275nCi/g gross beta, and 219 pCi/g gamma.

It is apparent that addressing the conditions in these tunnels will present a significant challenge during the D&D process, and that the following risks currently exist as a result the tunnel conditions:

1. The potential for migration of contaminants does exist since the tunnel floors are soil, and steam lines and the acid drain lines still run through the tunnels thus presenting a means of migration should one of these lines develop a leak.

2. The actual condition of the acid drain lines are not known; however, the potential for developing leaks is deemed credible.
3. The radiological conditions of tunnels #3 & 4 North have not been documented.

The inspection team believes that the hazards introduced by the tunnel conditions have been minimized for the DP-West staff by the following actions and do not in themselves necessitate immediate relocation of personnel:

- Lock access doors and prohibit personnel entry
- Radiation levels using a beta/gamma probe over the access ports did not indicate any increased radiation level.
- The area around DP-West has already been classified as a Solid Waste Management Unit and a soil sampling program has been established.
- Tunnels #2 & 5 were subsequently filled with concrete in an effort to seal and mitigate potential releases.

Additional actions may be taken to minimize the migration of contaminants and are discussed in section VI of this report.

- B. *"Paint covering up unknown levels of plutonium contamination on facility walls is peeling off".*

The inspection team did observe numerous areas in which paint was peeling off the walls which have markings indicating potential alpha contamination, and had the Rad Tech survey many of the areas that were seen. No contamination was indicated. Based on the initial decon efforts documented in the "Final Condition Reports" for each building and current survey results, the team did not consider the existing condition presented an immediate health hazard to the workers; however a general deficiency does exist and has been identified in section IV.3.B of this report.

- C. *"Residual plutonium contamination exists in facility ventilation duct work".*

The inspection team devoted significant effort addressing this issue. It is accurate to say that the actual condition of the ventilation ducts has not been consistently reported. A review of the Decon project "Final Condition Reports" for the various buildings state, "The interior surfaces of the *room air exhaust ducts* are contaminated..." to various levels. Discussions with Area Health Protection Technicians and DP-West management indicated that the only contaminated ducts are in the *Process ventilation*. This is also supported by the "SNM Holdup Measurements for Los Alamos Exhaust Ducts, Interim Phase II Report". Based on the data that is currently available there is reason to believe that the incorrect term was used in the "Final Condition Reports" and that the contamination is restricted to the "Process Ventilation" ducts; however, in an effort to assure this condition, the inspection team has identified additional actions that are required.

Resolution of this issue involves two separate activities. The first one is for the original authors of the Final Condition Report to identify exactly what was covered under the term "room air exhaust ducts". Secondly, the inspection team has requested that a set of radiological surveys of the room exhaust ducts be conducted, or prior survey results be provided to confirm the actual condition. These actions are currently still in progress, and final resolution will be assessed by LAAO Facility Operations Branch.

The "Process Ventilation" system has a chime alarm which upon a decrease in differential pressure in the system will alarm and initiate the evacuation of personnel, therefore minimizing any exposure to workers if a flow reversal were to occur and release the holdup material into the work space.

D. *Picric Acid concern:*

The inspection team shares the concern for the potential danger associated with the picric acid incident. However, the incident was not specific to the DP-West activities and in-fact affects many of the facilities at LANL. The team has reviewed the action taken by INC group and believe the process taken to address the issue will be best managed via the occurrence reporting system and corrective actions. No other containers of Picric acid were identified by the team.

E. *"Workers are exposed to asbestos from deteriorating piping insulation":*


The inspection team did observe two areas where friable asbestos was present. Even though this condition does exist, the inspection team does not consider it a serious health hazard to personnel based on the following items:

- The areas in which friable asbestos was observed are low-traffic, controlled areas which are not routinely accessed by the DP staff.
- It is apparent that many areas have been fixed and that a continuing effort is in place to correct the problems when discovered, with the exception of the D&D areas.

VI. Recommendation:

Based on the above observations and discussions the inspection team provides the following recommendations:

1. Since there were no immediate health or safety concern to the workers or the general public as a result of the existing facility conditions or its associated operations, immediate relocation of personnel is not required.
2. LANL should examine the feasibility of discontinuing use of the acid drain lines and collect waste in batches, similar to the action taken for the other waste streams in the facility. The major benefits to securing the use of the drain lines would be to minimize the insult to the environment via undetected leaks from these lines to the soil, and to reduce the risk of creating a greater radiological hazard in the tunnels which would have to be addressed during future D & D activities.
3. DP-west should task HS-1 with performing radiological surveys of the *room exhaust ducts* in order to confirm the actual radiological conditions, or provide other evidence that no contamination exists.
4. DP-West and HS-1 should improve the radiological survey documentation in such a way as to identify to the workers that each location of peeling paint or damaged walls has been appropriately surveyed
5. LANL HS-Division should review the conditions at DP-West and determine if workers should be placed on some type of bioassay program in order to monitor for potential alpha uptake or exposure.
6. LANL should aggressively pursue the relocation of personnel and D&D of the facility.



D. E. Glenn, Branch Chief
Facility Operations Branch

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4/30/93

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 J.P. SHIPLEY, F641
 M. WATERS, C302
 A. TIEDMAN A120
 D. HARBUR E500
 P. CUNNINGHAM F628
 B. WADT A108

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 C. BLACKWELL A106
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 R. WALLER C515
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 E. WEWERKA A102

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5-3-93 SAME REC'D. BY E.WEWERKA

United States Government

Department of Energy

memorandum

Albuquerque Field Office
Los Alamos Area Office
Los Alamos, New Mexico 87544

DATE: APR 29 1993

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: LFO/DG/1g

SUBJECT: Investigation of the Physical Conditions of DP-West

TO: Everet H. Beckner, DP-1, HQ
THRU: Bruce Twining, Manager, AL *JTB* BT

The attached report identifies the results of the comprehensive investigation (cited in your Memorandum dated April 6, 1993 to Dan Reicher of S-1) of the physical conditions of the DP-West facilities within Technical Area 21 of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).

This report confirms the position by LANL management that the conditions in the DP-West facilities does not present immediate health or safety concerns that warrant immediate relocation of the staff. The inspection performed by my staff did identify issues requiring corrective actions by LANL. These deficiencies and issues were relayed to DP-West management at the conclusion of the inspection and five (5) of the eleven (11) identified deficiencies have already been addressed, the others are either in progress or corrective actions are being developed. Many of the actions necessary to address the recommendations are also in progress. I have requested that LANL management report back to me on the status of the remaining open items within 30 days.

Please be assured that I and my staff will continue to perform walkthroughs of this facility until the LANL staff has been relocated.


Jerry L. Bellows
Area Manager

cc: w/out attachment:
J. Jackson, Director's Office,
LANL, MS A101
E. Wewerka, Associate Director,
LANL, MS A102

2176 1654

RECEIVED MAY - 3 1993

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A109	W. L. THOMPSON, SPECIAL ASSISTANT	
A105	J. D. IMMELE, ADNWT	
A110	J. C. BROWNE, ADCIS	
A113	R. W. SELDEN, ADLD	
A114	F. A. MORSE, ADPLS	
A107	M. G. STEVENSON, ADEE	
A108	J. T. WHETTEN, ADQPP	
A102	E. M. WEWERKA, ADCM	
A104	W. F. MILLER, ADRE	
A116	S. GERSTL, LDRD	
A112	S. MAARANEN, CNSS	
A120	A. J. TIEDMAN, ADO	
A119	T. R. GIBBS, CONT (ACTG.)	
A124	F. L. MENLOVE, DHR	
A124	N. K. MOORE, DDHR	
A130	L. M. D'ANNA, AA/EEO	
A183	W. R. HUGHES, LC	
A187		
A118	S. S. DUNCAN, PAO	
A150	CRM-4	

Handwritten notes and signatures:
 5-5
 (D) on [unclear]
 [unclear] [unclear]
 [unclear] [unclear]
 [unclear] [unclear]
 [unclear] [unclear]

COMMENTS: DISTR: J.M. PUCKETT, A109
 A. VALENTINE, 2918
 J.P. SHIPLEY, F641
 M. WATERS, C302
 A. TIEDMAN A120
 D. SANDSTROM G756
 A. GANCARZ J515

SHEILA BROWN, A187
 T.C. GUNDERSON, J591
 D.E. LANDRY, P913
 D.K. WINSTON, M995
 D. HARBUR E500
 A. HARTFORD J561

A.C. MCMILLAN, K491
 C. ROBERTSON, K303
 J. JACKSON A101
 F. MORSE A114
 P. CUNNINGHAM F628
 J. WHETTEN A108
 E. WEWERKA A102 W/
 ACTION DUE DATE:
 5/28/93

#42212
 Fr. TG
 G. Rouse
 R. Vetter

5-7-93