Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

June 9, 1995

ENTERED

Dear Interested Party:

On June 14, 1995, the Department of Energy (DOE) published the enclosed notice in the Federal Register announcing its intent to prepare a Stockpile Stewardship and Management (SSM) Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). Despite the end of the Cold War, DOE's responsibilities for ensuring the safety and reliability of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile remain unchanged. In order for DOE to meet these responsibilities in the post-Cold War environment, a new approach for maintaining confidence in the stockpile is needed. DOE intends to continue to fulfill its nuclear weapons responsibilities through the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. The notice includes background information explaining events that led to the development of this framework for determining the capabilities and facilities required in the future nuclear weapons complex.

Stockpile stewardship includes activities required to maintain a high level of confidence in the safety, reliability, and performance of nuclear weapons in the absence of underground nuclear testing, and to be prepared to test weapons if so directed by the President. Stockpile management activities include dismantlement, maintenance, evaluation, and repair or replacement of weapons in the existing stockpile. The SSM PEIS will analyze the environmental impacts of alternatives for the missions that are necessary to carry out the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program.

Comments on the proposed scope of the SSM PEIS are invited from the public. The comment period closes on August 11, 1995. Late comments will be considered to the extent practicable. Public scoping meetings to discuss issues and receive oral comments on the scope of the PEIS will be held at the eight candidate sites that may be affected by the proposed action(s). Enclosed is a fact sheet that provides the dates, times, and locations for the scoping meetings. Sign language and Spanish interpretation will be provided upon request. If you have any questions or need additional information, telephone, mail, and electronic means to contact the Department are also included in the enclosed fact sheet.

The Department of Energy appreciates your continued participation in this Program.

Sincerely,

Stephen M. Sohinki, Director
Office of Reconfiguration

Enclosures:
1. Notice of Intent
2. Fact Sheet on Scoping Meetings

4395

TR

Savannah River Site -- July 27
12:00 noon and 6:00 p.m.
The Aiken Municipal Center
214 Park Avenue, S.W.
Aiken, SC 29801

Nevada Test Site -- August 3 & 4
August 3: 6:00 p.m. and August 4: 8:30 a.m.
Community College of Southern Nevada/Cheyenne Campus
3200 East Cheyenne Avenue
North Las Vegas, NV 89030

Scoping Meeting Format. The Department intends to hold a plenary session at the beginning of each scoping hearing in which DOE officials will more fully explain the framework for the proposed SSM program, including preliminary alternatives for Stockpile Management, Stockpile Stewardship, and the NIF project. Following the plenary session, the Department intends to discuss relevant issues in more detail. Each scoping meeting is expected to last approximately three to four hours.

Issued in Washington, D.C. this 9th day of June 1995, for the United States Department of Energy.

Peter N. Brush
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Environment, Safety and Health

comments, ask questions, and discuss concerns regarding SSM activities with DOE officials, and for the Department to receive oral and written comments on the scope of the PEIS. Input from the scoping meetings will assist DOE in formulating the Implementation Plan for the SSM PEIS and refining PEIS alternatives. The locations, dates, and starting times for these public meetings are as follows:

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory -- June 29
12:00 noon and 6:00 p.m.
Villa Tassajara
6363 Tassajara Road
Pleasanton, CA 94566

Sandia National Laboratory -- July 11
12:00 noon and 6:00 p.m.
Albuquerque Convention Center
401 Second Street, N.W.
Albuquerque, NM 87102

Los Alamos National Laboratory -- July 13
12:00 noon and 6:00 p.m.
Fuller Lodge
2132 Central Avenue
Los Alamos, NM 87544

Kansas City Plant -- July 18
9:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m.
Rockhurst College
Massman Hall
1100 Rockhurst Road
53rd & Troost
Kansas City, MO 64110

Pantex -- July 20
12:00 noon and 7:00 p.m.
Sunset Convention Center
3601 West 15th
Amarillo, TX 79102

Y-12, Oak Ridge -- July 25
12:00 noon and 6:00 p.m.
Pollard Auditorium
Badger Avenue
Oak Ridge, TN 37830

treatment, storage, and disposal decisions resulting from the Waste Management PEIS.

Storage and Disposition of Weapons Usable Fissile Material PEIS. This PEIS is analyzing alternatives for the long-term storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials, primarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), and the disposition of excess plutonium. There is a potential overlap with the SSM PEIS regarding storage of strategic reserves of plutonium and HEU. Preparation of these PEISs will be closely coordinated to prevent conflicting analysis and to ensure that an appropriate decision on strategic reserve storage is reached.

Interim Actions. Two proposals that are within the scope of the SSM PEIS will proceed to separate Records of Decision, in accordance with Council on Environmental Quality regulations for interim actions (40 CFR 1506.1). These are the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility EIS, and the Tritium Supply and Recycling PEIS. In the case of the DARHT EIS, DOE will continue with its ongoing hydrodynamic testing program and has proposed to provide an enhanced hydrodynamic test capability in the near term regardless of the decisions to be made following this SSM PEIS. In the case of the Tritium Supply and Recycling PEIS, DOE needs to establish a long-term tritium supply regardless of the decisions to be made following this SSM PEIS. Thus, the DOE's decisions regarding these two proposals would not prejudice the outcome of the SSM PEIS.

Scoping Meetings. Public scoping meetings will be held at each site that may be affected by the proposed action. The interactive scoping meetings will provide the public with an opportunity to present

deciding whether to proceed with the facilities. For NIF, the programmatic assessment will also provide a basis for selecting a site for NIF since there are four candidate sites for that facility. However, for the CFF at LLNL, which is an upgrade to an existing facility, and for the Atlas Facility at LANL, which builds on special existing equipment at LANL, there are no alternative sites. If a decision is made to proceed with the NIF, CFF, or the Atlas Facility, the site-specific analyses in the SSM PEIS would provide the necessary NEPA analysis to decide where on the selected site to construct the facility, if relevant, and how to operate it.

Relationship to Other DOE NEPA Activities. In addition to the SSM PEIS, the Department is currently conducting NEPA reviews of other activities. The relationship between the SSM PEIS and other relevant major NEPA documents is discussed below.

Site-Wide EISs. DOE is currently preparing site-wide EISs for the Pantex Plant, NTS, and LANL. The site-wide EISs will address continued operations for current and reasonably foreseeable program missions at these sites. Programmatic issues such as what long-term capabilities are required to carry out DOE's Stockpile Stewardship and Management program, and the location for these long-term capabilities, will be addressed in the SSM PEIS.

Waste Management PEIS. This PEIS is analyzing alternatives for the long-term management and safe treatment, storage, and disposal of radioactive, hazardous, and mixed wastes. The SSM PEIS will assure that all wastes generated as a result of SSM activities are compatible with

Of these facilities, the Advanced Hydrotest Facility, the High Explosive Pulsed-Power Facility, and the Jupiter Facility are under consideration for proposal in the SSM PEIS. The Department may elect to proceed with only some of the facilities in this matrix.

The PEIS will also evaluate the no action alternative of not constructing new facilities or upgrading existing facilities. For Stockpile Stewardship, no action is described by the following matrix:

		Sites			
Capability	Facility	LANL	LLNL	NTS	SNL
Primary Physics Issues	Hydrotest Facilities	X	X	X	
Secondary Physics Issues	NOVA		X		
Secondary Physics Issues	Pegasus	X			
Radiation Hardness	Test Facilities				X

Site-Specific NEPA Reviews. The SSM PEIS will provide a programmatic assessment of environmental impacts to support programmatic decisions to: (1) identify the future missions of the SSM program; and (2) determine the facility locations. More detailed project-specific and site-specific NEPA analyses for individual activities and facilities generally would tier from the PEIS as necessary to implement the PEIS decisions. However, for the NIF, the Contained Firing Facility (CFF), and the Atlas Facility, the PEIS will include both a programmatic assessment, and a site-specific assessment of the construction and operation impacts at the reasonable candidate sites. The programmatic assessment will consider the cumulative and synergistic impacts associated with siting these facilities, and will provide a basis for

of underground nuclear testing will be assessed in the PEIS. Because the nuclear weapons testing mission has always been a primary responsibility of the weapons laboratories and the NTS, the Department does not believe it is reasonable to expand the stockpile stewardship mission to other sites. Therefore, only the three weapons laboratories (LANL, LLNL, and SNL) and the NTS are expected to be considered for new Stockpile Stewardship facilities. This is also consistent with one of the Stockpile Stewardship program's main purposes to preserve the core intellectual and technical competencies of the weapons laboratories. Because there is currently a moratorium on underground nuclear testing, and because the nation is pursuing a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Department has not made a decision whether it is reasonable to include underground nuclear testing as an alternative in the SSM PEIS to fulfill the Stockpile Stewardship mission. Comments on this issue are specifically invited during the scoping period.

The following matrix of proposed alternatives and facilities under consideration for proposal has been developed for Stockpile Stewardship:

		Site Alternatives			
Capability	Facility	LANL	LLNL	NTS	SNL
Primary Physics Issues	Contained Firing Facility		X		
Primary Physics Issues	Advanced Hydrotest Facility	X	X	X	X
Secondary Physics Issues	National Ignition Facility	X	X	X	X
Secondary Physics Issues	High Explosive Pulsed-Power Facility	X	X	X	X
Secondary Physics Issues	Atlas Facility	X			
X-Ray Hardness	Jupiter Facility	X	X	X	X

	Site Alternatives							
Capability	KCP	LANL	LLNL	NTS	Y-12	PX	SNL	SRS
Weapons Assembly/Disassembly				X		X		
Nonnuclear Components	X	X	X				X	
Nuclear Components								
- Pit Reuse (minor)		X		X		X		X
- Replacement Pit Fabrication and Reuse (major)		X						X
- Secondaries and Cases		X	X		X			
High Explosives Components		X	X			X		

In addition, the PEIS will also evaluate the no action alternative. For Stockpile Management, no action is described by the following matrix:

	Sites							
Capability	KCP	LANL	LLNL	NTS	Y-12	PX	SNL	SRS
Weapons Assembly/Disassembly						X		
Nonnuclear Components	X	X					X	
Nuclear Components								
- Replacement Pit Fabrication and Reuse (major)		X	X					
- Secondaries and Cases					X			
High Explosives Components						X		

Stockpile Stewardship. The PEIS will assess the alternatives for conducting the Stockpile Stewardship mission. New facilities and upgraded facilities that will enable the Department to maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of the stockpile in the absence

X-Ray Hardness. The study of radiation-effects science and materials certification. The facility under consideration is:

Jupiter Facility. If proposed, Jupiter would provide an x-ray environment to enhance the ability to certify that critical weapon components meet military requirements for x-ray hardness.

Computational Capabilities. To handle simulations of weapon performance and assessments of weapons safety without underground nuclear testing, improved computational capabilities are needed. However, because there are not expected to be any environmental impacts from this activity, the PEIS is not expected to provide any assessment of these capabilities.

PEIS Alternatives. Preliminary Stockpile Management and Stockpile Stewardship alternatives have been developed for public comment and are described below.

Stockpile Management. The PEIS will assess the alternatives for conducting the Stockpile Management mission. Based upon the capabilities and facilities that already exist in the Complex, no major new production facilities are currently proposed. Instead, the PEIS will evaluate upgrading and/or downsizing facilities at the sites where the Stockpile Management capabilities are currently located, as well as transferring the functions to other sites which have existing facilities that could be modified to perform the capability. Based upon an evaluation of the existing capabilities and facilities at the sites in the Complex, the following matrix of proposed alternatives has been developed for Stockpile Management:

Advanced Hydrotest Facility. If proposed, this facility would provide up to eight radiographic views of the primary's implosion symmetry. In the longer term, this facility may be essential for assuring weapon reliability and safety without nuclear testing.

Secondary Physics Issues. The study of issues related to the safety and reliability of the secondary portion of nuclear weapons. Issues include physics validation, material behavior, improved understanding of thermonuclear ignition, and ability to assess age-related defects. Some of these facilities may also investigate physics phenomena that relate to primaries. The facilities proposed or under consideration are:

National Ignition Facility (NIF). This facility would make it possible in the laboratory, for the first time ever, to study radiation physics in a regime close to that of nuclear weapon detonations. The PEIS will contain a full evaluation for site selection, and for site-specific construction and operational impacts.

High Explosive Pulsed-Power Facility (HEPPF). If proposed, the HEPPF would provide experimental capabilities for studying secondary physics issues at shock pressures and velocities approaching those of actual weapon conditions.

Atlas Facility. The Atlas Facility at LANL would be used for hydrodynamic experiments to resolve issues related to boost-gas mixing and other primary physics, and improving the predictive capabilities related to the aging, reliability, and performance of secondaries. The facility builds on special existing equipment at LANL. The PEIS will contain a full evaluation for site-specific construction and operational impacts.

Substantial advances in experimental and computational capabilities are needed to fill in those areas of nuclear weapon science that are incomplete, particularly gaps in our understanding of physics and gaps in the data needed for computational simulations of weapons performance and model-based assessments of safety and reliability. Upgraded or new experimental capabilities are required to validate improved or new computational models.

Without these enhanced capabilities, the Department will lack the ability to evaluate some safety and reliability issues, which could significantly affect the stockpile. It is also possible that, without these enhanced capabilities, the Department would not be able to certify the acceptability of weapons components that had been repaired or modified to address future safety or reliability issues.

The capabilities needed by the Department to carry out its Stockpile Stewardship responsibilities are described below, along with a brief description of proposed facilities for each capability.

Primary Physics Issues. The study of issues related to the safety and reliability of the primary portion of nuclear weapons. Issues include physics validation, material behavior, improved understanding of implosion, and ability to assess age-related defects. The facilities proposed or under consideration are:

Contained Firing Facility. An addition to the Flash X-Ray hydrodynamic test facility at LLNL, this facility would provide hydrodynamic test capabilities and new diagnostics for improved studies of the behavior of weapons material. The PEIS will contain a full evaluation for site-specific construction and operational impacts.

Stockpile Stewardship. Stockpile Stewardship includes activities required to maintain a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the absence of underground nuclear testing, and to be prepared to resume testing if so directed by the President. While the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile is currently judged to be safe, secure, and reliable, the average age of the stockpile has never significantly exceeded the current age of 12 to 13 years. Furthermore, very few data exist for weapons older than 25 years. Because the Department cannot predict with certainty when age-related changes affecting weapon safety or reliability will occur, a conservative assumption would be that problems will arise more frequently as the weapons age beyond their original 20- to 25-year design lifetimes.

Historically, nuclear testing has provided unambiguous confidence in the safety and performance of weapons in the stockpile. Without underground nuclear testing, the Department must rely on experimental and computational capabilities, especially in weapons physics, to predict the consequences of the complex problems that are likely to occur in an aging stockpile.

Enhanced aboveground experimental and computational capabilities are needed to assess and predict the consequences of these problems. An improved science-based program with enhanced experimental and computational capabilities is necessary to maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of the nation's stockpile without nuclear testing. This program must be of sufficient technical challenge to attract the high-quality scientific and technical talent needed for future stewardship of the stockpile.

Stockpile Management proposal will be to downsize and/or consolidate functions to provide an effective and efficient production capability for the smaller stockpile. The capabilities needed by the Department to carry out its Stockpile Management responsibilities are described below:

Weapons Assembly/Disassembly. Provides the capability to: dismantle retired weapons; assemble high explosives, nuclear components, and nonnuclear components into nuclear weapons; repair and modify weapons; perform weapons surveillance; and store strategic reserves of nuclear components (pits and secondaries).

Nonnuclear Components. Provides the capability to: fabricate nonnuclear components and perform nonnuclear component surveillance.

Nuclear Components. Provides the capability to: fabricate nuclear components; perform nuclear component surveillance; stage and store nuclear materials and components. Alternatives will be assessed for:

Pit Reuse (minor). Nonintrusive modification and recertification of existing pits.

Replacement Pit Fabrication and Reuse (major). Fabrication of replacement pits and/or intrusive modification and recertification of existing pits.

Secondaries and Cases. Fabrication of replacement secondaries and cases.

High Explosives. Provides the capability to fabricate high explosives components and perform high explosives component surveillance.

* Minimize the use of hazardous materials and the number and volume of waste streams.

PEIS Decisions. In addition to the PEIS, supporting cost, technical, and schedule studies will be prepared for the SSM program. The PEIS and these other studies will be balanced with policy and strategic objectives to support the Record of Decision (ROD). The ROD will:

* Identify the future missions of the SSM program; and
* Determine the configuration (facility locations) of the nuclear weapons complex to accomplish the SSM program missions.

Project-specific NEPA documents will be prepared as necessary to implement any programmatic alternatives chosen in the ROD.

An analysis of the sensitivity of the proposed SSM program configuration to a range of hypothetical stockpile sizes will also be performed. DOE expects to use the stockpile size consistent with the START II protocol (approximately 3,500 weapons) as the baseline for the PEIS analysis since this is the current planning guidance for the Department and is consistent with the recently completed Nuclear Posture Review. Upper and lower excursion cases are also expected to be analyzed.

The SSM Program

Stockpile Management. Stockpile Management activities include dismantlement, maintenance, evaluation, and repair or replacement of weapons and weapons components in the existing stockpile. In the past, a large weapons production complex provided the capability and capacity to rapidly fix any problems found in the stockpile. However, the existing production complex may be inefficient and ineffective for a much smaller stockpile. Therefore, one of the primary goals of the

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) (Albuquerque, New Mexico) - Conducts system engineering of nuclear weapons; designs and develops nonnuclear components; conducts field and laboratory nonnuclear testing; manufactures nonnuclear weapons components; and provides safety and reliability assessments of the stockpile.

Nevada Test Site (NTS) (Las Vegas, Nevada) - Maintains capability to conduct underground nuclear testing and nonnuclear experiments.

SSM Program Foundational Framework. In the SSM program and SSM PEIS, DOE will:

* Emphasize compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and accepted practices regarding industrial and weapons safety; safeguarding the health of Complex workers and the general public; protecting the environment; and ensuring the security of nuclear materials and weapons components.
* Safely and reliably maintain the nuclear weapons stockpile as directed by the President and mandated by Congress.
* Analyze alternatives for configuration of the nuclear weapons complex that are reflective of, and consistent with, policy direction from the Nuclear Posture Review.
* Maximize efficiency and minimize costs associated with the maintenance of the weapons stockpile.
* Maximize the transfer of nonnuclear materials production activities to the private sector.
* Maintain core intellectual and technical competencies in nuclear weapons.
* Sustain confidence in safety and reliability of the stockpile in the absence of underground nuclear testing.

Pantex Plant (Amarillo, Texas) - Dismantles retired weapons; fabricates high explosives components; assembles high explosives, nuclear components, and nonnuclear components into nuclear weapons; repairs and modifies weapons; evaluates and performs nonnuclear testing of nuclear weapons.

Savannah River Site (SRS) (Aiken, South Carolina) - Tritium loading/unloading and surveillance of tritium reservoirs.

Y-12 Plant (Oak Ridge, Tennessee) - Maintains the capability to produce and assemble uranium and lithium components; recovers uranium and lithium materials from the component fabrication process and retired weapons; produces nonnuclear weapon components.

Kansas City Plant (KCP) (Kansas City, Missouri) - Manufactures nonnuclear weapons components.

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) (Livermore, California) - Conducts research and development of nuclear weapons; designs and tests advanced technology concepts; maintains a weapons design program; maintains a limited capability to fabricate plutonium components; provides safety and reliability assessments of the stockpile.

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) (Los Alamos, New Mexico) - Conducts research and development of nuclear weapons; designs and tests advanced technology concepts; maintains a weapons design program; maintains a limited capability to fabricate plutonium components; provides safety and reliability assessments of the stockpile.

program is essential if the nation is to properly safeguard its nuclear weapons and maintain an unquestioned nuclear deterrent.

The SSM program is being developed to meet the challenges involved in ensuring the safety and reliability of the stockpile. Three particular challenges must be met:

- Fully supporting, at all times, the nation's nuclear deterrent with safe and reliable nuclear weapons, while transforming the nuclear weapons complex (laboratories and production facilities) to one that is more appropriate for the smaller stockpile.
- Preserving the core intellectual and technical competencies of the weapons laboratories. Without nuclear testing, confidence in the nation's nuclear deterrent will depend largely on the continued competency of the people who must make the scientific and technical judgments related to the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons.
- Ensuring that the activities needed to maintain the nation's nuclear deterrent are consistent with the nation's arms-control and nonproliferation objectives.

DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex: The current DOE nuclear weapons complex consists of 8 major facilities located in 7 states. Currently, the Complex maintains a limited capability to design and manufacture nuclear weapons; provides surveillance of and maintains nuclear weapons in the stockpile; and retires and disposes of nuclear weapons. Major facilities and their primary responsibilities within the Complex are listed below:

the nation has halted the development of new nuclear weapons, has begun closing portions of the Complex, and is considering further consolidation or downsizing of the remaining elements in the Complex. In addition, the nation is observing a moratorium on nuclear testing and is pursuing a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

However, international dangers remain and, as the President has emphasized, nuclear deterrence will continue to be a cornerstone of the United States' national security policy. Thus, the Department's responsibilities for ensuring the safety and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile will also continue for the foreseeable future.

Because of the moratorium on nuclear testing, the termination of new nuclear weapons development and production, and the closure of several production facilities, a new approach to ensure confidence in the stockpile is needed. In announcing the indefinite extension of the nuclear testing moratorium (July 1993), President Clinton reaffirmed the importance of maintaining confidence in the enduring United States nuclear stockpile and the need to ensure that the nation's nuclear deterrent remains unquestioned during a test ban. By Presidential Decision Directive and Act of Congress (Pub. L. 103-160), the Department of Energy was directed to establish a stewardship program to ensure the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons in the absence of nuclear testing.

Without nuclear testing, this new approach must rely on scientific understanding and expert judgment to predict, identify, and correct problems affecting the safety and reliability of the stockpile. This

On May 19, 1995, the Department held a pre-scoping workshop with interested members of the public to discuss the framework of the SSM program and the information contained in "The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program". While a wide range of specific issues were discussed during that meeting, general concerns centered on: future stockpile planning, including the basis for selecting the baseline stockpile size of the future; whether the Department would evaluate a range of stockpile sizes in the PEIS; the relationship between the SSM PEIS and the Department's other Programmatic and Site-Wide EISs; and whether the Department would evaluate underground nuclear testing in the PEIS. Comments received from that pre-scoping workshop have been taken into account in developing this NOI.

Purpose and Need for the SSM Program. Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 USC 2011 et seq.), DOE is charged with providing nuclear weapons to support the United States' nuclear deterrent policy. The mission of the DOE nuclear weapons complex is to provide the nation with safe and reliable nuclear weapons and components so that an effective nuclear deterrent can be maintained into the foreseeable future, and to accomplish this in a way that protects the environment and the health and safety of workers and the public.

Recent changes in national security needs have necessitated corresponding changes in the way the Department must meet its responsibilities regarding the nation's nuclear weapons. As a result of international arms-control agreements (the START I treaty and the START II protocol) and unilateral decisions by the United States, the nation's stockpile will be significantly reduced by the year 2003. Consequently,

any realistic proposal for reconfiguration of the Complex (59 FR 54175, October 28, 1994). Contributing factors to that conclusion included public comments at the September-October 1993 Reconfiguration PEIS scoping meetings, the fact that no production of new nuclear weapons types was required for the foreseeable future, budget constraints, and the Department's decision to prepare a separate PEIS on Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Nuclear Materials (Notice of Intent published June 21, 1994, 59 FR 17344).

As a result of these changed circumstances, the Department separated the previously planned Reconfiguration PEIS into two new PEISs: (1) a Tritium Supply and Recycling PEIS; and (2) a Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. The Draft PEIS for Tritium Supply and Recycling was issued in March 1995 (60 FR 14433, March 17, 1995), public hearings were held in April 1995, and a Final PEIS for Tritium Supply and Recycling is expected in October 1995.

With regard to the SSM PEIS, during the past six months the Department has been developing the new framework to support the SSM program. That resulting framework, described in a DOE report entitled "The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program" (May 1995), is available on the Internet under DOE's Home Page for Defense Programs (www.dp.doe.gov). That document was mailed to individuals who had previously requested information on the SSM program. Other individuals who would like to receive that document can contact the Office of Reconfiguration at the address listed above or by calling the program's toll free number at 1-800-776-2765.

As an alternative, comments can also be submitted electronically by using the Federal Information Exchange bulletin board and following the instructions listed below:

Modem:	Dial Toll Free (800) 783-3349. Local (301) 258-0953. (Modem parameters set at: '8' data bits, '1' stop bit and 'N' parity at 1200, 2400 or 9600 baud.)
InterNet:	Telnet or Gopher to: fedix.fie.com or 192.111.228.33
Hours:	Available 24 hours a day. A Help Line, (301) 975-0103, is available weekdays between 8:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. EST, except Federal holidays.
Costs:	Free, no cost to users. No telephone, registration, access, or downloading fees.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general information on the DOE NEPA process, please contact:

Carol M. Borgstrom, Director
Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance, EH-42
U.S. Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20585
(202) 586-4600 or 1-800-472-2756

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background. In January 1991, the then-Secretary of Energy announced that the Department would prepare a PEIS examining alternatives for the reconfiguration of the Department's nuclear weapons complex (the Complex). The framework for the Reconfiguration PEIS was described in the January 1991 Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study (Reconfiguration Study), a detailed examination of alternatives for the future Complex. Because of significant changes in the world since January 1991, especially with regard to projected future requirements for the United States' nuclear weapons stockpile, the Department concluded in October 1994 that the framework described in the Reconfiguration Study no longer fit current circumstances or supported

and issue an Implementation Plan (IP) to describe the scope of the PEIS, the alternatives that will be analyzed, and the schedule for completing the PEIS.

DATES: Comments on the proposed scope of the SSM PEIS are invited from the public. To ensure consideration in the preparation of the IP, comments must be postmarked by August 11, 1995. Late comments will be considered to the extent practicable. DOE will hold interactive public scoping meetings at sites that may be affected by the proposed action to discuss issues and receive oral and written comments on the scope of the PEIS. These meetings will provide the public with an opportunity to present comments, ask questions, and discuss concerns with DOE officials regarding SSM activities. The locations, dates, and times for these public meetings are included in the Supplementary Information section of this notice, and will be announced by additional appropriate means.

The Department is also requesting federal agencies that desire to be designated as cooperating agencies on the SSM PEIS to contact the Office of Reconfiguration at the address listed below by August 11, 1995.

ADDRESSES: General questions concerning the SSM program can be asked by calling the toll-free telephone number at 1-800-776-2765, or by writing to:

Stephen M. Sohinki, Director
Office of Reconfiguration
U.S. Department of Energy
P.O. Box 3417
Alexandria, VA 22302

[6450-01-P]

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP AND MANAGEMENT PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

AGENCY: Department of Energy

ACTION: Notice of Intent

SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) announces its intent to prepare a Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (SSM PEIS). The end of the Cold War has brought about significant changes in the requirements for the nation's nuclear deterrent, including substantial reductions in the nuclear weapons stockpile. To fulfill its responsibilities for ensuring the safety and reliability of the stockpile without underground nuclear testing, DOE proposes the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program.

Stockpile Stewardship includes activities required to maintain a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the absence of underground nuclear testing, and to be prepared to resume nuclear testing if so directed by the President. Stockpile Management activities include dismantlement, maintenance, evaluation, and repair or replacement of weapons and their components in the existing stockpile.

This Notice of Intent, the initial step in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, informs the public of the PEIS proposal, announces the schedule for scoping meetings, and solicits public input. Following the scoping period, the Department will prepare