




Department of Energy
Carlsbad Field Office
P.O. Box 3090
Carlsbad, New Mexico 88221
FEB 19 2015



Mr. Val Cannon, Manager
Quality Assurance
Nuclear Waste Partnership LLC
P.O. Box 2078
Carlsbad, NM 88221-2078

Subject: Surveillance Report S-15-23, Evaluation of the Investigation and Video of Conditions of WIPP Panel 7, Room 7 in Support of the Accident Investigation Board Forensic Team

Dear Mr. Cannon:

The Carlsbad Field Office conducted the subject surveillance January 6-29, 2015. Results of the surveillance are provided in the enclosed report. No deficiencies were noted during the surveillance.

If you have any questions or comments concerning the surveillance, I can be reached at (575) 234-7491.

Sincerely,

Dennis S. Miehl
Senior Quality Assurance Specialist

Enclosure



cc: w/enclosure
D. Bryson, CBFO *ED
W. Mouser, CBFO ED
M. Brown, CBFO ED
M. Navarrete CBFO ED
R. McQuinn, NWP ED
J. Blankenhorn, NWP ED
J. Harris, NWP ED
S. Kennedy, NWP ED
W. MacMillan, NWP ED
J. Vandekraats, NWP ED
C. Chester, NWP ED
T. Padilla, NWP ED
B. Allen, NWP ED
S. Punchois, NWP ED
S. Escareno-Soto, NWP ED
W. Ledford, NWP ED
T. Peake, EPA ED
L. Bender, EPA ED
S. Ghose, EPA ED
R. Lee, EPA ED
J. Kieling, NMED ED
S. Holmes, NMED ED
R. Maestas, NMED ED
C. Smith, NMED ED
D. Winters, DNFSB ED
V. Daub, CTAC ED
R. Allen, CTAC ED
P. Martinez, CTAC ED
B. Pace, CTAC ED
K. Kirkes, CTAC ED
D. Harvill, CTAC ED
G. White, CTAC ED

CBFO QA File

CBFO M&RC

*ED denotes electronic distribution

CBFO SURVEILLANCE REPORT

Surveillance Number: S-15-23

Date of Surveillance: January 6 – 29, 2015

Surveillance Title: Evaluation of the Investigation and Video of Conditions of WIPP Panel 7, Room 7 in Support of the Accident Investigation Board (AIB) Forensic Team

Organization: Nuclear Waste Partnership LLC (NWP)

Surveillance Team:

Kirk Kirkes Surveillance Team Lead, Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) Technical Assistance Contractor (CTAC)

Surveillance Scope:

The surveillance evaluated the performance of work associated with REACH equipment used to investigate and video panel 7, room 7 in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) underground (U/G) in support of the AIB Forensic Team.

Governing Documents/Requirements:

- Work Order (WO) 1408978 C
- MWO 00534
- Pre-job Briefing form #EA04AD3030-1-0
- Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 14-044

Activities Evaluated:

The surveillance team evaluated the performance of work during the investigation of panel 7, room 7 in the WIPP U/G using the REACH equipment. Guidance was provided from the AIB Inspection Plan annotating the locations within the waste array to investigate. Initial entries encountered problems with the camera systems not transmitting video to the control monitor for recording. Meetings with the camera vendor, who was on-site, as well as mine phone communications during the first several entries resulted in a determination that the portable power supply was not providing sufficient voltage for the expected operation. Once this issue was resolved, camera operations and video recording was restored and performed as expected.

The location of the waste in room 7 is in an east/west row arrangement (rows 1– 24), with columns 1 through 6 in a north-to-south direction, respectively. Loose/broken roof bolts suspended between columns 2 and 3, and also columns 4 and 5, required careful manipulation of the trolley and beam so as to prevent damage to the beam and camera system. This also required beam removal after completing inspections of columns 5 and 6, moving the trolley past the suspended bolts and re-installing the beam to inspect columns 3 and 4. This was again performed after completion of inspecting columns 3 and 4 and re-installed for inspection of columns 1 and 2.

A weekly pre-job briefing was conducted on the surface for the MWO 00534 work package regarding mine entry and exit. Prior to each U/G entry and at the conclusion of each workday, Emergency Services Technicians would acquire vitals from all the team members to establish baseline information. A daily pre-job briefing in the S1000 U/G lunch room was conducted for WO 1408978C and RWP 14-044 packages prior to conducting REACH activities. The team would don the required personal protective equipment (PPE) at E140/S1950 transition line and then traverse to panel 7, room 7. Once at room 7, radiological control (radcon) personnel would set up portable continuous air monitors (CAMs) and perform surveys of the area to ensure no changes had occurred since the previous entry. A thermal reading was acquired above the waste stack to measure for any heat sources, and air quality checks were also performed. After all acceptable readings were achieved, the REACH team set up the camera equipment and commenced video surveillance. As mentioned earlier, there were three separate areas of inspection consisting of two columns in each area.

The first area to inspect was columns 5 and 6. This commenced with an aerial view using the dome camera from row 24 back to row 1 at the bulkhead. The next step was to install the Induktun camera to video specific void spaces between the waste columns. This was accomplished by lowering the camera to ground level taking a 360 degree video. These areas of concern were identified by the AIB Inspection Plan. Once all areas of interest were inspected in columns 5 and 6, the team would dismantle the beam, move the trolley past the suspended bolts, and re-assemble the beam to prepare inspection of columns 3 and 4. It was observed that during the re-assembly of the beam to commence the inspection of columns 1 and 2, the team was notified by mine phone to evacuate the mine when Station A CAM alpha readings had exceeded the limits established by ESS-2014-03, *Re-Entry Activities for Haul Truck Fire and Radiological Release Events* (>2000 dpm/100cm² Alpha). The evacuation was performed compliantly with radcon personnel staged at the transition line to assist in doffing/frisking of personnel who were exiting panel 7. After the mine evacuation, it was determined that radon was the source of the alpha readings.

It was observed that the mine environment and associated PPE requirements presented unusual challenges for the team with close coordination between multiple organizations a necessity. The challenges encountered were successfully addressed.


Surveillance Results:

Overall, the surveillance team determined that the activities associated with the investigation and video of WIPP panel 7, room 7, were satisfactorily implemented for compliance with associated governing documents. No concerns were identified as a result of the surveillance.

Deficiencies:

NONE

Surveillance Team Leader:



Kirk Kirkes

Date:

2/5/15


Assistant Manager/Office Director:

N/A

Date:

N/A

CBFO QA Director Approval:



Date:

2-17-15